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Abstract:  
This study investigates the relationship and shock transmission between firm leverage 
and systematic risk within the Shari’ah stock screening rules among seven European 
countries with a sample of 689 firms for the period from 2008 Q2 to 2013 Q1. Due to 
the fact that high leverage augments systematic risk and accentuates the firm’s 
vulnerability to shocks, debt screening is used to examine the sampled portfolios. As it 
imposes limits on debt, we examined the impact of such an ethical screening and a risk 
moderating principle on stock volatility, susceptibility to contagion and the implications 
for portfolio diversification. Using a vector autoregressive dynamic panel of multi-
country framework, systematic risk is analysed by taking into account firm 
characteristics, country effects, and the heterogeneity across firms, thereby ensuring the 
robustness of results. Our findings suggest that the systematic risk changes with 
changes in the capital structure; the Shari’ah-compliant stocks are shown in most cases 
to carry less risk than conventional stock, while they do not necessarily out-perform in 
terms of return; during the global financial crisis. We conclude that during the global 
financial crisis, Islamic compliant stocks demonstrated lower values of systematic risk 
in the case of ‘Low Debt’ portfolios when comparison to ‘High Debt’ portfolios.  
 
Keywords: Systematic risk, leverage, Shari’ah stock screening, financial crisis, 
contagion, dynamic GMM panel technique. 
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1. Introduction 
Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) advance that the root cause of modern financial crises has 
been excessive debt. In an attempt to substantiate this argument, understanding the level 
of corporate debt and volatility in relation to contagion under normal economic 
conditions and under shocks has been an important academic and policy concern. While 
there is considerable research on capital structure and its relation to systematic risk 
(financial risk and business risk), there appears to be no consensus regarding the 
measure of impact of leverage over the systematic risk for firms (Ben-Zion and Shalit, 
1975; Castagna and Matolcsy, 1978; March and Shapiro, 1987; Bhandari, 1988; Engle 
and Ng, 1993; Weber, 2004). Moreover, little has been reported from the Shari’ah 
perspective, which takes into account the impact of the quantitative screening of debt. 
In achieving Islamic compliance, Shari’ah screening, as part of an array of financial 
principles stipulates that a portfolio and the financial composition of a company should 
consist of no more than 33% debt to ensure stability and moderate risk exposure. 
Considering the financial difficulties observed in the European markets, which can to a 
certain extent be attributed to heavy debt, this study tests the implications of such a 
prudent financial constraint on European stocks. The effects of Shari’ah constraints on 
European stocks are measured with reference to the following question: ‘if the debt 
screening as part of Shari’ah compliancy had been applied to the European stock, what 
would have happened to systemic risk exposure?’ Thus, this paper aims to contribute 
to the literature by focusing on debt stock screening, as to the best of our knowledge, 
such a method has not yet been tested in literature.  
Analysing the relationship between leverage and systematic risk is important due to its 
impact on share valuation (Duett et al., 1996). However, only limited number of studies 
have focused on this relationship within the Islamic finance framework by applying the 
stock screening filters (quantitative and qualitative). A list and status of all sectors based 
on qualitative stock screening is provided in Appendix. In this study we examine the 
relationship between debt and beta that serves our measure of systematic risk within the 
Shari’ah debt screening framework. Our approach serves as an interesting channel for 
investigating systematic risk and price volatility behaviour within the normative 
principles of Islamic finance. 
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Among the key issues that we examine in this paper is the impact of the 33% debt 
threshold used in the screening of stocks according to Shari’ah principles, that has 
recognisable impact on the performance of compliant portfolios. Given that such an 
imposed threshold level limits financial leverage, one would expect screened portfolios 
to have lower beta (β). However, the existing literature is inconclusive; Omet and Al-
Debi’e (2000), Rowe and Kim (2010), Tan et al. (2015), have documented that financial 
leverage and systematic risk (β) are not necessarily positively correlated. En passant we 
note beta is the sum of both operating and financial leverage and the 33% Shari’ah 
screening threshold only limits financial leverage and does not have any implications 
for the operating leverage constituent of beta. As such, relationship between the lower 
systematic risk (β) and volatility of a Shari’ah compliant portfolio cannot be taken as a 
priori. Purpose of our study is to contribute empirically whether Shari’ah compliant 
stocks due to their lower leverage also have a lower systemic risk as measured by beta.  
In passing we note that according to Shari’ah principles, a single financial leverage 
threshold of 33% is used in debt screening regardless of whether the underlying industry 
or business risk would have an inherent bias. ‘Capital structure theory’ tells us that the 
optimal debt level should vary by industry according to its operating leverage in the 
sense that firms in high operating leverage industries should have low financial leverage 
and vice-versa. If companies attempt to maximize firm value by optimising their capital 
structure, then the use of a single threshold, as is done in debt screening, can be 
problematic. Specifically, if 33% is low financial leverage; then the companies selected 
would be high operating leverage companies that are keeping their debt ratios low. The 
implication here is that the Shari’ah compliant portfolio would consist of high business 
risk firms. As a result, even with limiting the debt threshold, the overall portfolio would 
still have a high systematic risk beta β, since the qualifying stocks would all have high 
operating leverage. Alternatively, it can also be argued that where the underlying 
business risk is low, the 33% threshold would pick companies that are not maximizing 
firm value because they have too little leverage. Those firms are not at optimal capital 
structure and it is of significant importance for a firm to determine its optimum level of 
debt (Goetzmann et al., 2005). 
The last two arguments imply that a Shari’ah compliant portfolio may not necessarily 
be mean-variance optimal. The use of a single threshold across all firms can lead to a 
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selection of high business risk firms whose optimal capital structure requires debt below 
33% or low risk businesses that are under leveraged. As such, there is no a priori reason 
to believe that the Shari’ah screening procedure would always lead to low systematic 
risk portfolios. 
Consequently, based on the threshold of 33% level of debt, this study analyses whether 
systematic risk changes with changes in the capital structure of the firm in cases both 
of low debt (LD) and high debt (HD) firms within seven European countries. In 
addition, the behaviour of the combined portfolio of low debt and high debt (LD + HD) 
is analysed in a portfolio analysis. Firms, that have been qualitatively screened and 
which have a capital structure of less than 33% in accordance with the first quantitative 
criteria of debt stock screening, are ‘good’ candidates for consideration as compliant 
stock. 
Regarding the contagion effect, it is interesting to investigate whether low debt has less 
of a negative impact during shocks. Volatility increases during crisis periods by driving 
contagion into inter-related capital markets, which become more correlated during 
turmoil conditions. In the periods of contagion, firms with higher leverage become more 
vulnerable to markets and financial risks (see: Ahmad et al., 2013; Duncan and 
Kabundi, 2013, Hwang et al., 2013, among others). 
Based on this given context, this study is focused on the following three objectives:  
(i) measuring the impact of leverage on systematic risk (also known as sensitivity to 
market risk);  
(ii) examining how applying Shari’ah stock screening to levered and unlevered betas 
(computed at the country level for the seven countries) could bring more micro-
stability to the European capital market; and  
(iii) analysing such an impact for the global financial crisis period, since we expect it 
to be amplified (addressed in section 5.5).  
We thus consider three portfolio strategies: (i) LD (low debt) portfolio; (ii) HD (high 
debt) portfolio; and (iii) combined portfolio of LD and HD, for investigating the 
behaviour of levered and unlevered betas in the seven countries, as a combined group 
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of countries and also as individual countries. The capital structure of each portfolio and 
the level of debt (measured as debt over total assets) are incorporated into this analysis 
and applied to each set of 20 quarters: (from 2008 Q2 to 2013 Q1). This data interval 
was selected to encompass the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC) period. We then 
employed continuous wavelet analysis (wavelet transform coherency: WTC), which 
focuses on different stock-holding periods or investment horizons of the investors, to 
levered and unlevered betas. This allows us to investigate the lead-lag relationship 
between systematic risk and specific factors such as leverage, sovereign debt and firm 
size in the portfolio with a special focus on the impact of the global crisis on financial 
risk. 
Our study is one of the first to analyse the impact of leverage on Shari’ah screened 
stocks (both qualitative and quantitative), and our methodology is in line with the 
Islamic boards of the Financial Times Islamic Index Series (FTSE International 
Limited, 2007) and the Morgan Stanley Capital International Islamic Index Series 
(MSCI, 2007). 
We show that there is a direct correlation between systemic risk and capital structure 
and that Shari’ah compliant stocks (with debt ratio less than 33%) are found to carry 
less risk than their conventional counterparts. In addition, during the 2008 global 
financial crisis, Shari’ah compliant stocks showed lower systematic risk, which 
particularly so for low-debt portfolios in comparison to high-debt portfolios within 
country cases as well as across the sampled countries. Overall our findings suggest that 
there is a positive and significant correlation between leverage impact and systematic 
risk and that systematic risk is augmented by leverage. Furthermore, based on our 
sample we find a significant positive correlation between debt and sensitivity to market 
risk and systematic risk is driven by the debt level. This is in line with Shari’ah 
compliance process. We also find the debt level plays a substantial role in the shorter-
term shock transmission for levered and unlevered betas (compared to the longer-term 
shock), especially during periods of financial crisis, as in the recent global financial 
crisis. Summarising, our findings provide further evidence that debt screening imposed 
in Shari’ah compliant portfolio can be effective in controlling systematic risk. Our 
findings have important implications for investors, the stability of the stock market in 
terms of moderating systemic risk as well as for regulators. For example, regulators, 
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accordingly, should be able to develop necessary structures and standards on reducing 
excessive debt in the stock market. As for investors, in line with the findings of this 
study, profit-and-loss sharing type equity structures encouraged by Islamic finance may 
be more appealing in terms of low leverage and higher stability. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: A brief empirical literature review 
on systematic risk and leverage is presented in Section 2 in order to provide an empirical 
framework for this study. Section 3 presents details of Shari’ah screening and its impact 
on stock and portfolio behaviour in relation to leverage, which aims to provide the main 
substance and context for the research. Section 4 explains the research methodology 
and data collection process, Section 5 presents the results and discusses and analyses 
the findings. Lastly, Section 6 concludes and reflects on the findings whilst exploring 
potential policy implications. 
2. Empirical Studies on Systematic Risk and Leverage 
Common stock risk has been classified into two components: the systematic risk 
(unavoidable risk) and the unsystematic risk (avoidable through diversification). There 
is a considerable body of literature on the sensitivity to market risk. The salient research 
on the impact of leverage on systematic risk2 is discussed below.  
There have been numerous studies on systematic risk and leverage. For example, 
Hamada (1972) found that leverage can be used to explain 21 to 24% value of the 
common stock β. Lev (1974) discovered an empirical relationship between a firm’s 
operating leverage and the market β. Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975) found firm size, 
leverage and other variables to be the significant determinants of a firm’s β. Similarly, 
Castagna and Matolcsy (1978) upheld that debt-to-equity ratio, debt-to-total assets 
ratio, interest coverage bore significant correlations with the systematic risk. Bhandari’s 
(1988) research suggested that the ‘debt to equity’ ratio is positively correlated with the 
expected common stock returns. Thus, an asymmetric response of equity systematic 
risk to past stock performance can be transmitted through the variance asymmetry 
channel. Barclay and Smith (1995) in their empirical study on volatility and debt 
																																								 																				
2 Measuring systematic risk is related to the works on basic portfolio model by Markowitz (1952, 1959) and the capital asset pricing 
model by Sharpe (1964) using an average β value of the stocks comprised in the portfolio. 
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structure found that firms chose shorter debt maturity if they had higher asset volatility; 
however, they did not study the effects of systematic and idiosyncratic risks. 
Jie and Zhang (2011) used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) based on the Fama-
French (1993) three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model3. They 
examined whether the observed negative relation between leverage changes and stock 
returns reflected these stocks’ different cross-sectional loadings on systematic risk 
factors. The alphas from the regressions represented the risk-adjusted returns of the 
portfolios and they expected the alphas to be similar across all portfolios. Although the 
factor models could not explain the negative correlation between the changes in 
leverage ratio and next-quarter stock returns, a firm’s capital structure choice might 
depend on other firm characteristics not captured by these factors. More recent evidence 
suggests, however, that a firm’s debt maturity changes over the business cycle, as 
identified by Erel et al. (2011). They showed that new debt issuances shifted towards 
shorter maturity and more security during times of poor macroeconomic conditions. 
Mian and Santos (2011) suggest	that the effective maturity of syndicated loans is pro-
cyclical, especially for credit worthy firms. In a more recent study, in exploring the 
relationship between systemic risk and debt maturity, Chen et al. (2012) found that 
firms with high systematic risk would favour longer debt maturity and the maturity 
structure for firms with higher asset beta would be relatively stable over the business 
cycle. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the lower the leverage, the lower the 
market sensitivity. This is documented in many previous studies such as March and 
Shapiro (1987) and Weber (2004). 
3. Debt Screening and Shari’ah Stock and Portfolio Behaviour in Relation to 
Leverage 
 The Islamic capital market has its own set of legal and ethical rules shaping its 
operations, which are mainly provided by AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions). Accordingly, along with the 
prohibition of interest, low and moderate risk investments should be encouraged 
(Ashraf and Khawaja, 2016; Causse, 2009, 2010; Jouini, 2009), while excessive levels 
of debt, uncertainty (gharar) and unnecessary risk positions at the level of any 
																																								 																				
3 three-factor plus the momentum factor 
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investment should be avoided. It also encourages greater social responsibility, moral 
values, and sustainable finance, all of which contribute towards stability in the markets 
(Al-Suwailem, 2012). Among these principles, the debt ratio limitation at the threshold 
level of 33% is considered one of the main criteria in the Islamic stock and portfolio 
screening. 
Despite the fact that it is well established in the literature that the risk of low debt firms 
(or portfolios) is lower than that of high debt firms (or portfolios), the impact of the cut-
off debt level of 33% used in Shari’ah stock screening on the return and risks has not 
been investigated yet. Thus, we can argue that the effect of the debt level cut-off rate of 
33% on the firm’s behaviour is still unclear due to the lack of empirical evidence 
regarding this issue, which this study aims to address. 
One key argument is that a single financial leverage threshold of 33%, used in Shari’ah 
screening regardless of the underlying industry or business risk, can have an inherent 
bias. According to ‘capital structure theory’, the optimal debt level should vary by 
industry depending on its operating leverage, while Shari’ah screening utilises a single 
financial leverage threshold of 33% despite the underlying industry or business risk. 
Therefore, a Shari’ah compliant portfolio may not necessarily be mean-variance 
optimal. Subsequently a unique cut-off level of debt of 33% may lead to a selection of 
firms having low risk businesses that are under leveraged or high business risk firms 
whose optimal capital structure requires debt below 33%. Thus, there is no upfront 
reason to believe that the systematic screening procedure will always lead to a low total 
risk portfolio. 
Shari’ah compliant portfolio selection and its asset allocation have some specific 
features and conditions to be observed. The firms have to meet the qualitative and 
quantitative criteria according to the screening guidelines. For example, an Islamic 
equity fund manager will have a choice of investing in different industrial sectors by 
constructing portfolios only with firms that have shares that are qualitatively screened 
and have their level of debt ratio below a certain threshold determined in accordance 
with Shari’ah stock screening guidelines (AAOIFI standards number 21). Thus, 
optimizing the portfolio becomes complicated when equity has to be excluded due to 
its non-compliance with the screening criteria, in this instance, if its level of debt 
exceeds the debt level ratio of 33%, we can expect two consequences:  
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(i) This will reduce the investment universe of firms in which investors may take 
position and hence create higher systematic risk for the same level of expected returns 
by shifting the mean-variance efficient frontier (MVEF) to the right as supported by 
Johnson and Neave (1996).  
(ii) This will exclude, de facto, those very risky firms that have a higher probability of 
financial distress and bankruptcy risks, and hence will improve the total risk over the 
whole market pulling the MVEF back to the left, which can help reach superior 
portfolios and adduce additional efficiency (Obaidullah, 2006). 
Empirical evidence on negative screening produced mixed results. While Humphrey 
and Lee (2011) found that negative screening increased portfolio risk and reduced 
diversification, Lee et al. (2010) found that an increased screening may lead to a 
reduction of stock-selection returns albeit with lower systematic risk.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the trade-off concept within the Shari’ah stock 
screening, as stringent quantitative ratios can increase the quality of the assets, but 
drastically reduce the size of the investment universe and vice versa. Maximizing 
investment in compliant shares means accepting a trade-off between avoiding potential 
risky firms and expanding the universe of firms in which it is possible to invest. 
4. Empirical Methodology and Data 
This section presents the empirical methodology and describes the variables used in the 
empirical model, which also present the details of data collection and selection process. 
4.1. The econometric models for systematic risk 
In line with Olibe et al. (2008), we adopt the following model in an attempt to develop 
an empirical model for systemic risk: 𝛽"# 	= 	 α"# + 	a	𝛽"#)* + λ1"#		𝐷"#)* + λ2"#	DMY + λ3"#	DMY	x		𝐷"#)* + £#." 	 678967669:6 "# +	φ".#		𝑀𝑇𝐵"# + ψ	MarketCap"# + b	𝑅𝑂𝐸"#)* + c	ExRate	M# + d	D2GDPM# + γ#."	ln	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸"# 	+	𝜀"#                (1) 
where: 
i,t and m: the firm i at the quarter t in the market m (as a country)  α"#:  the intercept which is free to vary over time 𝛽"#	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛽"#)*: systematic risk of the firm i at the quarter t and quarter (t-1) 𝐷"#)*: total debt divided by total equity (as capital structure) measured at the 
end of quarter (t-1) 
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DMY: is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the	D2TASSETS ≤ 33%; otherwise 
zero λ2"#, λ3"#: the coefficients for the intercept and the interaction effect between the 
level of debt and the capital structure 678967669:6 "#4: Total sales over total assets as a proxy for international exports 
MTBit:  Market-to-book will be replaced by its proxy ‘price to book value’ MarketCap"#: Market capitalisation of the firm 𝑅𝑂𝐸"#)*: Return on equity of the firm ExRate	M#: The exchange rate for the currency of country m against USD D2GDPM#: The country level of debt over its GDP in percentage 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸"#: The weight of the firm based on the size of the sample using total assets 
We added exchange rate and country debt level to take into account the currency and 
sovereign debt effects (ExRate + Sovereign	Debt	to	GDP). 
The paper applies relatively advanced panel techniques based on dynamic GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments) both difference and system. To achieve robust 
modelling, as can be seen above, a set of variables on firm characteristics and two other 
variables at the country level, such as exchange rate and the sovereign debt, were added. 
We computed the quarterly βfg	by using daily stock market return and market stock 
index for each quarter. The systematic risk of the firm i and the quarter t is computed 
as follows:        
βfg = 	 hijkl(	lno,lp,o)rkl(lp,o)       (2) 
This provides us with a time series of total beta of each firm for the same period of time. 
The beta portfolio βsg and the quarter t is computed based on the following formula: βgs = 	Σ	wf,gβfg	                  (3) 
We have opted for the unbalanced data since not all of the market capitalisation and 
‘price to book value’ were available for all the firms and countries. In order to obtain a 
clearer view of the impact of firm size, we referred to the weight of each firm, which is 
based on its total assets against the total assets of all the firms in the sample. 
																																								 																				
4 678967669:6 : FATA was the degree of international diversification defined as foreign assets scaled by total assets in the model Olibe 
et al. (2008). We have replaced the FATA variable by	 678967669:6  because the sales are considered as a proxy for international exports; 
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There are, however, two limitations pertaining to the use of the variance: (i) the 
asymmetry is not well captured by the variance (co-variance) and; (ii) the asymmetric 
distribution variance might not be a good measure. Despite these limitations, we still 
can draw certain conclusions, since we are investigating the leverage effect on the 
systematic risk behaviour based on a comparison between low debt and high debt 
portfolios and not as absolute values for a stand-alone investment. 
4.2. Modelling financial risk versus business risk or Beta components 
The financial risk versus business risk or beta components are given in the equation 
below making the separation between levered and unlevered betas for a firm:  𝜷𝑳,𝒕y𝟏 	= 	𝜷𝒂,𝒕y𝟏			[	𝟏 + 	 𝟏 − 𝑻 	𝑫𝒕𝑬𝒕		]     (4) 
where:   
βL = Levered beta for the equity in the firm 
βa = Unlevered beta of the firm (i.e., the beta of the firm without any debt) 
T = Marginal tax rate 𝑫𝒕𝑬𝒕 = 𝝓, Debt-to-Equity ratio (market value)  
Based on the equation (3), we derive the following equation: 𝜷𝒂.𝒕y𝟏 	= 	 		 𝜷𝑳.𝒕𝟏𝟏y𝝀	𝝓         (5) 
where: 
 𝜙 =	 and λ = (1 –T) 
We notice that this model shows a positive correlation between the two betas 
(𝛽,#y*	and 𝛽,#y*). A simplified formula of levered beta called the Practitioner's model 
(Ruback 1995; Fernandez 2003) uses only the capital structure and is given as follows:  
𝜷𝒂,𝒕y𝟏 	= 	 		 𝜷𝑳.𝒕𝟏𝟏y		𝝓        (5.1) 
In this model, the obtained levered beta is higher than the Damodaran formula because 
the term (1 – T) has been removed.  However, this model (equation 5.1) is not used in 
this study. Kalev and Zolotoy (2012) used a model that takes into account the systematic 
risk (beta debt) in relation to the lagged debt of the firm. It is based on a multivariate 
generalization of Hamada’s (1972) formula for levered CAPM beta. It shows that 
Hamada’s (1972) result can be extended to any linear factor model, and in particular to 
the Fama–French three-factor model. According to Fernández (2004), the relationship 
between systematic risk, beta debt and unlevered beta provided by Kalev and Zolotoy’s 
model is valid only for a company that maintains a fixed book-value leverage ratio. It 
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assumes that the unlevered beta is always higher than the beta of debt; consequently, 
the levered beta is higher than the beta of debt. Their model represents one possible 
channel through which stock equity risk (𝛽) can be affected by past stock returns and 
for distinguishing between levered and unlevered beta (𝛽).  The Damodaran formula is 
obtained from the Fernández model by assuming the debt beta as zero. In this paper, 
we use the Damodaran (1994) model (equation 5), which provides levered beta that is 
always higher than unlevered beta (𝛽,#y*). Investigating the changes in levered beta 
and debt beta helps us to analyse the change in shock transmission. This qualitative 
analysis constitutes a proxy to study the beta debt. Since we do not need to conduct a 
direct analysis of the beta debt, the Fernández formula is not used in this study, as it 
omits the taxation effect (1-T). 
4.3. Data selection 
We have analysed data from eight countries with a larger sample of firms for the period 
from 2008 Q2 to 2013 Q1. The data have been collected from Reuters Datastream. 
Shari’ah non-compliant sectors such as Interest based banks, producers of alcohol etc. 
were excluded. The final sample includes 689 firms from seven countries (Austria, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain) based on data availability. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the retained firms in their respective countries. It 
should be noted that all the firms have been screened qualitatively, then the debt 
threshold of 33% filter has been applied. The aggregate information shows the number 
of firms segregated between low and high debt using the threshold ratio of 33%. 
Insert Table 1 here 
We started with a sample of 3596 firms distributed over seven countries. This sample 
was then filtered to exclude the missing values of the parameters (such as: total Equity 
= “NULL”, Total Assets= “NULL” or Market Capitalisation = “NULL”).5 The 
aggregate information in Table 1 shows the number of firms segregated between low 
and high debt using the threshold ratio of 33%. 
For each firm we collected total debt and total equity on a quarterly basis. Data on the 
daily share values were extracted, from which we calculated the quarterly mean return, 
																																								 																				
5 MySQL software was used to organise and filter the data. 
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quarterly standard deviation and systematic risk. We used the statistical definition on 
the daily values of the return of both the firm and the country taken from the Dow Jones 
stock market to compute the quarterly systematic risk for each firm, following which 
we analysed the same for each country.  We then divided the filtered sample into High 
Debt - HD (total debt to total assets (D2TASSETS) > 0.33) and Low Debt - LD 
(D2TASSETS <= 0.33). 
As depicted in table 1, we could not select a period of time greater than five years. In 
fact, by working on the quarterly basis, the majority of firms display the debt ratio 
swinging up and down around the threshold. For example, we have only 24 high debt 
firms in Poland but zero low debt firms for the same period of time. This is due to the 
missing values of the most important parameters. On the other hand, there is no problem 
obtaining a good sample for the high debt firms ((D2TASSETS) > 0.33). The largest 
sample consists of 181 high debt and 161 low debt firms from Germany. Since the 
econometric model co-mingles both high and low debt portfolios, a dummy variable 
has been used to distinguish between the two. 
5. Results and Interpretation 
In this section the relationship between capital structure and systematic risk is analysed 
by using both difference and system GMM. Consecutively, we investigate the levered 
and unlevered betas for the seven countries as one portfolio that is segmented into three 
portfolio strategies of LD, HD and the combined (LD + HD). The same analysis is 
applied at the country level.  
It should be noted that the total assets (expressed in US$) for all the LD portfolio 
countries is equal to US$76,77 trillion, while the total assets for the HD portfolio 
countries is equal to US$87,42 trillion. The size ratio of HD to LD is equal to 11.39. 
However, in the case of the Netherlands (country number 5) the total assets for LD is 
higher than the HD (2.69 times more), while the opposite is true for all the other 
countries. In the case of Germany (country 3) the ratio is more than 20 times in favour 
of high debt firms (HD/LD total assets = 20.79). 
We conclude the analysis by looking at the effect of the GFC-2008 on betas and their 
lead-lag cross correlation using the continuous wavelet coherency.  
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5.1. Systematic risk 
In fulfilling the first objective by measuring the impact of leverage on systematic risk, 
we applied difference GMM and system.6  We have defined the GMM specification as 
‘predetermined but not strictly exogenous’. Therefore, the variables are classified into 
the following three categories: (i) endogenous; (ii) predetermined but not strictly 
exogenous; (iii) strictly exogenous, which are depicted in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 here 
System GMM does not assume normality and it allows for heteroscedasticity in the 
data. We applied the two-step estimation in order to obtain the robust Sargan test (based 
on the robust Hansen J-test), which is not available in one-step estimation (Roodman, 
2009). In so doing, in order to investigate the relationship between the capital structure 
and the systematic risk, we conducted both one-step and two-step estimations based on 
various tests (see Table 3.a). As can be seen in Table 3.a, the failure to reject the null 
hypotheses in Sargan tests (or Hansen J-test) and AR2 test indicates that the instruments 
used are valid. This is based on the ‘two-step robust’ with ‘no collapse’ sub-option for 
systematic risk, using both the constant dummy and ‘interactive dummy’ variables. 
Any one of these four estimations can be chosen but we selected the third estimation, 
which is GMM- 2 Steps robust with the sub-option ‘no-collapse’ (NC) with Lags 6 and 
7 (see Table 3.a Model 3), as this estimation presents the highest T-ratio for the 
‘Weight’ variable (T-ratio for ‘w’ equal to 2.99), and because firm size is one of the 
five common risk factors affecting the firm’s return (Fama and French, 1993; 2012). 
Overall, our results were similar for most of the scenarios suggesting that the findings 
reported above were robust. 
																																								 																				
6 GMM in our analysis with an option called ‘robust option’ and sub-options of ‘non collapse’ and ‘collapse’. The ‘collapse’ sub-
option allowed the system to reduce the number of instruments. thus lowering the ‘size’ of the sample. By experimenting with 
different lag options and sub-options, we optimised the likelihood of obtaining accurate results. Subsequently, for consistency and 
serial correlation, we applied the diagnostics for realizing the optimality of the instruments. The most important point to ascertain 
is the validity of the instruments. To ensure that the instruments used were still valid (Yalta and Yalta, 2012), the second order 
serial correlation related to the differenced residuals or Arellano and Bond test (AR2) and the Sargan or Hansen J-test should not 
have their null hypotheses rejected. . 
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5.2. Interpretation and discussion of analysis 
In the previous section we tested the null hypothesis for AR2 (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), which is in line with the validity of the instruments used based on the second 
order serial correlation related to the differenced residuals. 
The econometric model as expressed in equation 1 is based on capital structure 
(debt/equity) and the level of debt (total debt to total assets), and we found that these 
two variables were positively correlated. Hence, by analysing the capital structure, we 
could infer the same conclusion for the level of debt. In this estimation we added a 
dummy variable. Thereby, for the lagged capital structure variable we used the 
interrelated dummy variable in relation to the level of debt, expressed as total debt over 
total assets of the firm.  
Table 3.a provides the dynamic panel data estimators using GMM for the systematic 
risk (beta) versus capital structure. The four estimations of GMM- 2 Steps robust with 
the sub-option ‘no-collapse’ (NC) (Model 1 to Model 6) appear to present interesting 
results. Model 3 with Lags (6 7) seems to be the most pertinent estimation since the T-
ratio is the highest one (equal to 2.99). It is well established that size has a large impact 
on the value of systematic risk. For this reason, we consider this the best estimation (see 
Model 3 in Table 3.a) on which to build our discussion. As the results demonstrate, only 
the coefficient of the weight (total assets of the firm over total assets of the sample) 
appears more likely to be estimated precisely in the case of Model 3 with no restrictions 
on the instrument set for 268 over-identifying restrictions and with 243 instruments in 
total.  
Insert Table 3.a here 
The results suggest that the debt effect on systematic risk or β exists due to both firm 
level and market effects, and that the weight has the strongest impact; while the lagged 
systematic risk effect also carries the same impact as the capital structure (lagged beta 
and lagged capital structure are both negatively correlated with beta). In particular, a 
change of 1% of lagged value of beta will induce a change of 0.2% in the value of beta. 
The lagged ‘return over equity’ ROEfg)*		is also negatively correlated. However, the 
exchange rate does not seem to be statistically significant. This is quite intuitive, if we 
el Alaoui, AbdelKader Ouatik; Bacha, O. I; Masih, M. & Asutay, Mehmet (2016). “Shari'ah Stock Screening, 
Sensitivity to Market Risk and Contagion: A Multi-Country Analysis”, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.023. 
Please refer to the published version at the JEBO (2016) 
16 
	
consider the fact that the European stock markets are highly integrated, with the Euro 
zone playing a big role. The impact of the exchange rate will, therefore, have little effect 
on the change of beta at the level of the firm within the European market. 
As for the lagged leverage effects, the correlation is positive for both low debt and high 
debt portfolios, while the interactive dummy variable (related to the level of debt) is 
statistically insignificant. However, the dummy variable has decreased the value of the 
estimated constant in terms of the absolute value. More precisely, the systematic risk 
value drops by 24% from 0.4996 (constant value in the third model estimation) to 
0.3793 (since the dummy variable is equal to -0.1203 for firms with a ratio of ‘debt-to-
equity’ less than 33%). This result is obtained for both low debt (304 firms) and high 
debt firms (385 firms). It should be noted that the firms with a low level of debt have 
small capitalization compared to those with a high level of debt (in fact the size ratio of 
HD portfolio is more than 11 times higher than LD). Nonetheless, we found no 
difference for the interrelated dummy variable which otherwise would have impacted 
on the capital structure (level of debt as ‘debt-over-equity’). 
The sovereign debt effect seems to have no statistically significant impact on systematic 
risk, β. This is because a quarterly change in the sovereign debt will not affect the 
systematic risk of the firm on the stock market.   
In the next section, we further explore the impact of a financial crises by splitting the 
portfolio into pre and post financial crises whereby we capture the structural breaks to 
determine the cut-off points. 
5.3. Structural breaks  
In this section we examine quarterly data to determine endogenously the most important 
dates on which structural breaks occurred simultaneously for all firms aggregated in 
one portfolio (LD+HD) and then separately for HD and LD. We analyse the presence 
of these breaks using the capital structure variable in order to study its effect on the 
systematic risk in the European stock markets. In order to achieve this, we made use of 
the test developed by Zivot and Andrews, and the result are depicted in Figure 1, which 
indicates the most probable break-points in the data. To find the structural breaks, we 
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consider the total sample of studied firms as consolidated in three portfolios: LD, HD 
and combined (LD+HD). 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
 
We were able to derive some key conclusions from the results obtained from this test: 
Firstly, regarding the mean reversion properties of these series, we concluded that we 
can reject the H0 hypothesis for the three studied series at 5% significance level. 
Interestingly, both series for ‘all firms’ (LD+HD) and HD firms were seen as containing 
a structural break point at 2010 Q1 while the LD series shows a structural break point 
at 2011 Q4. 
Searching for the source of structural breaks in each time series, the results suggest that 
a one-time break related to the European Central Bank (ECB) package has an impact 
on HD firms. This regulatory measure is aimed at bringing more liquidity to the 
European markets as occurred at the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. It is well 
known that ECB policy shifted in interest rate management and quantitative easing 
packages whereby significant decreases in interest rates were permitted. A one-time 
break with an impact on the LD firms we examined is detected in the 2011 Q4 
suggesting the possible impact of the peak of severity of the European sovereign debt 
crisis. 
Lastly, it is important to recognize that the results are derived from endogenously 
determining the presence of a single structural break. However, it can be argued that 
the data may contain more than one structural break which could result in a lack of 
robustness to the test (Lee and Strazicich, 2003). This could be the case in the LD series, 
which seems to exhibit two other structural breaks. However, we have limited this 
analysis to the most significant one, as mentioned above. 
In the estimations, therefore, we included the two structural breaks in our analysis by 
adding two different dummy variables (DUM_HD and DUM_LD) with the objective 
of capturing the structural breaks that were potentially affecting the behaviour of HD 
and LD firms. This allowed us to analyse the pre-break and post-break samples to reveal 
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evidence about the effect of these two breaks. The two dummy variables (DUM_HD 
and DUM_LD) were added. 
Table 3.b provides the most pertinent estimation of the dynamic panel data estimators 
using GMM for the systematic risk (β) versus capital structure. Among the four 
estimations of GMM- 2 Steps robust, only the one with the lag (4 4) with the sub-option 
‘no-collapse’ (NC) is pertinent as it is shows a significant impact of the lagged beta in 
line with our previous results. The three estimations with different lags: (1 1), (4 6) and 
(6 6) were discarded because they demonstrated no impact of the lagged β (their T-ratio 
for lagged β was lower than 2 and respectively equal to 0.58, 1.85 and 0.50). 
Insert Table 3.b here 
 
In line with the previous results, the systematic risk, β, is positively correlated with the 
lagged systematic risk and the weight of the firm in the portfolio (T-ratio = 3.98). It is 
negatively correlated with the lagged capital structure (as T-ratio = 1.93 is near to 2) 
and the price to book market (T-ratio = 3.40).  
Turning to the impact of both structural breaks measured through the two dummy 
variables (DUM_HD and DUM_LD), the correlation is significant and negative for LD 
(the coefficient estimate is equal to 0.0468) portfolio, while it turns out not to be 
significant for the HD portfolios. The dummy variable of LD has decreased the value 
of the estimated constant of β in terms of the absolute value.  Compared with the HD 
portfolio, the systematic risk value decreases by approximately 12% from 0.3855 to 
0.3387 (constant value). 
The structural break which occurred during the European sovereign debt shock (2011 
Q1) decreased the value of β for LD compared with HD. This confirms the fact that a 
financial shock reinforces the position of systematic risk of LD firms (with a ‘debt-to-
equity’ ratio less than 33%) in the European stock market. Therefore, investors may 
have opted for less risky firms during the Greek crisis. This strengthens the fact that 
Shari’ah compliant firms can have a lower systematic risk than non-compliant firms.  
In summary, the results indicate that the systematic risk for LD firms is almost always 
less than the HD firms and that the difference in absolute value is quite significant 
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(24%). The European sovereign debt has reinforced the position of LD firms in terms 
of systematic risk, β, by a drop of 12% compared to HD firms. However, the first 
structural break due to the first shock of the European sovereign crisis (2010 Q1) has 
not affected the systematic risk of both LD and HD firms in the European market.  We 
believe that this is because at the beginning of the shock, the Greek economy was 
considered too small to be able to influence the systematic risk of the firms in the 
European stock market as a whole. This is in line with the Shari’ah perspectives based 
on the debt stock screening set at the threshold of 33% maximum. 
Moreover, the size of the firm (expressed as the weight within the whole portfolio) and 
the lagged value of ROE were seen to be positively correlated with systematic risk, 
while the ‘price to book value’ was negatively correlated with systematic risk. This is 
in line with the theory. However, intuitively, the lagged idiosyncratic systematic risk of 
a specific stock is expected to have a significant bearing on its own current value.  
5.4. Levered and unlevered beta analysis 
Based on portfolio theory, we tested the model and its implications in order to examine 
the link between systematic risk and debt in both cases: levered and unlevered betas 
using equations 2 and 5. In order to do so, we computed betas (levered and unlevered) 
for the three portfolios: LD, HD and combined. First, we investigated the seven 
countries. We then we analysed data from each individual country, before adding the 
capital structure of each portfolio and the level of debt (debt over total assets) for each 
of the 20 quarters: from 2008 Q2 to 2013 Q1 in order to encompass the GFC-2008 
period.  
Figure 2.a shows six graphs showing the change in levered and unlevered betas for the 
three portfolios, while Figure 2.b illustrates the change in capital structure and debt to 
total assets for the same portfolios over the same 20 quarters.  
Insert Figure 2.a here 
Insert Figure 2.b here 
In Figure 2.a, we can see that the HD and the combined portfolios have the same 
behaviour in terms of changes and trend for both levered and unlevered betas. The HD 
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portfolio shows a slightly higher value of levered beta than the combined portfolio. This 
is caused by the impact of financial risk (due to high level of debt) of the HD portfolio 
being slightly higher than the combined portfolio. In fact, the latter category contains 
LD firms which make systematic risk slightly lower than the beta of the HD portfolio. 
The opposite is the case with unlevered beta for the same two portfolios since the 
unlevered beta is seen to be free from the financial risk related to the leverage effect. 
This enables the combined portfolio to benefit from the positive impact of the lower 
systematic risk of those firms in the LD portfolio. 
The unlevered beta for the LD portfolio in Figure 2.b is very low and different from the 
two previous ones (HD and combined portfolios in Figure 2.a). This can be explained 
by the absence of debt impact on the unlevered beta. The levered beta of the LD 
portfolio has lower values than the levered beta for the HD and combined portfolios. It 
presents bigger changes which are depicted by the two peaks from the large shocks: the 
first one just after the GFC-2008 and the second during the European sovereign debt 
crisis. As can be seen, the second peak is of longer duration (18 months) than the first 
(12 months). We believe that one of the factors behind this was the fact that 
international investors perceived the US market to be less risky than the European 
market during this period. Our findings display the total assets (as a proxy for 
capitalisation) of the LD portfolio as 2.5 times smaller than that of the HD portfolio, 
which contradicts the common idea that small capitalisation firms have higher 
systematic risk compared to bigger firms. 
Insert Figure 2.c here 
Figure 2.c shows that capital structure and ‘debt to total assets’ for the LD portfolio 
remain very low (around 10%) and quasi constant showing less sensitivity to the change 
in debt and financial risk in the market. Nevertheless, both HD and combined portfolios 
present larger changes in the trend of capital structure (‘debt to equity’) with a spike 
reaching 120% following the same trend as the levered beta. The same two portfolios 
also have a quasi-constant value of ‘debt to total assets’ (D2TA). This implies that the 
firm’s equity may decrease, while at the same time, the debt of the firm remains 
constant along with ‘debt to total assets’. In fact, the ‘total assets’ of the firm are more 
likely to stay quasi unchanged in the short term, from one quarter to another. 
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Notably during financial shocks, even with sufficient liquidity, firms have more 
difficulty in increasing their debt, while it is easier to decrease their equity by buying 
back their own shares on the stock markets. The buying back of shares supports their 
share prices as the per-share earnings go up. Accordingly, many corporations have 
become more strategic with the timing of their share buybacks.  We have seen that this 
occurs specifically when the share prices fall, especially following shocks.  By 
purchasing the shares at this time, the firms can limit price decline. However, this 
finding needs to be supported by further research. 
5.4.1 Country level analysis for levered beta 
In this section, we compute the levered beta for LD, HD and a combined portfolio for 
each individual country in order to analyse the impact of the level of debt on systematic 
risk. At the country level, the 33% threshold does not seem important. Even if there is 
a difference between the countries in terms of the size of samples, the analysis allows 
us to draw some interesting conclusions and to rank the countries according to their 
level of systematic risk between different periods of time. Thus, Table 4 as illustrated 
in Figure 3 panels depicts the results for levered β per country for High Debt and Low 
debt for their values as min, max and delta max-min. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
Our findings show that in major countries, high debt firms are riskier than low debt 
firms in terms of levered β (see Figures 3.a., 3.b., 3.c, and 3.d). except in the case of the 
Netherlands where this result is partially reversed (see Figure 3.e) showing lower β for 
high debt firms compared to low debt firms in 55% of cases. This abnormal finding 
could be due to the domestic stimulus by the government of the Netherlands to support 
its capital market, which directly benefits the big firms. However, more study is 
required to understand the different behaviour of the LD and HD portfolios in the case 
of the Netherlands. Meanwhile, as the theory would suggest. the combined portfolio 
experiences a levered β level between those of the HD and LD portfolios in each of the 
countries including the Netherlands (see Figures from 3.a to 3.e). These combined 
portfolios also present a quasi-same level of systematic risk as the HD portfolio. 
excluding the Netherlands (see Figures 3.a., 3.b., 3.c and 3.d). 
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Insert Figure 3.a here 
Insert Figure 3.b here 
Insert Figure 3.c here 
Insert Figure 3.d here 
	 	
The Netherlands’ combined portfolio (with 82 firms) bears less systematic risk 
compared to the HD portfolio, thus demonstrating the benefit of adding the LD portfolio 
debt to the HD portfolio.  It also shows its positive impact in lowering the combined 
beta compared to Italy (with 43 firms) or Germany (with 308 firms), where the beta of 
the combined portfolio is practically	equal to the beta of the high debt portfolio (the low 
debt portfolio has no effect on the combined portfolio).  
Insert Figure 3.e here 
Since it is only Poland and Spain that solely have HD portfolios,7 we can see from 
figures 2.f and 2.g that the Spanish portfolio shows higher systematic risk than the 
Polish portfolio with one exception in the first quarter of 2013 which we consider here 
as an outlier. 
Figure 3 panels (illustrating data of table 4) shows that France has a higher risk related 
to the HD portfolio in comparison to six other countries (decreasing as follows: France, 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain and Poland), but conversely Germany 
displays a higher risk for the LD portfolio. Based on the results, it would appear that 
one of the best portfolio strategies is to avoid investing in HD firms in France and LD 
firms in Germany but to invest in combined portfolio firms in the Netherlands. This is 
due to the fact that the latter provide higher maximum change in levered beta as a 
difference between the minimum and the maximum values which represent systematic 
risk. 
																																								 																				
7 Figures related to Poland and Spain are not presented in this manuscript in order to save space. 
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In the case of the HD portfolio, Poland increasingly shows lower risk in comparison to 
the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Austria, France and Spain. Whereas, for the LD 
portfolio, Austria displays the minimum levered beta when we compare it with the 
maximum levered beta of Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands. However, the 
leverage effect on systematic risk is weaker in the Austrian market for the LD portfolio 
and in Spain for the HD portfolio which allows the two markets to be more stable since 
the marginal systematic risk is lower (figure 4). The findings, hence, broadly support 
previous evidences that low debt firms show less systematic risk than high debt firms 
in major countries. The only exception is the case of the Netherlands which has 
produced mixed results. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
5.5. Contagion effect on levered and unlevered betas and wavelet coherence 
This section addresses the third objective by analysing the impact of Shari’ah stock 
screening applied to levered and unlevered βs during the recent global financial crisis. 
The sensitivities to market risk (levered and unlevered betas) are computed at the 
country level for the seven countries. This section, hence, analyses the short term impact 
of leverage on systematic risk of common stocks within seven European countries. We 
focus specifically on the period of the global financial crisis of 2008 (GFC). Within this 
context, we investigate the impact of the lower level of debt as suggested by Shari’ah 
stock screening. This should reduce systematic risk of common stocks and, therefore, 
is useful to the risk averse financial managers and investors who seek to invest in firms 
with lower beta value. 
Financial contagion happens when there are many near crises happening 
simultaneously. Nevertheless, this may not be sufficient to explain the cause of  the 
contagion, which has to be ascertained through causal links. External regional shocks 
and global shocks affecting several countries can have common threads in the case of 
causal connections. This common cause is independent from shocks, with the exclusion 
of the case of the financial crisis. By using a wavelet method, Ranta (2013), we found 
that several times in the last twenty-five years, contagion was a major factor in the 
major world markets and strong signs of contagion could be seen during the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009.  
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This analysis uses wavelet coherence as follows: (a) as a robustness test to choose the 
most important variables to be considered in the dynamic panel technique model, and 
(b) to analyse the co-movement and the shock transmission in the European markets. It 
is generally used to isolate the effects generated mainly by short term contagion shocks 
from the fundamental-based contagion shocks. Wavelet techniques and particularly 
wavelet coherence have been used by many authors, including Rua and Nunes (2009), 
Ranta (2013), Reboredo and Rivera-Castro (2014), Saiti et al. (2015) and Dewandaru 
et al. (2016).  
If we use other tests such as Markov switching (regime changes), we may not be able 
to verify the different frequency domains which are considered as a major added value 
of the wavelet technique. Some changes in the correlations, that could otherwise be 
missed with ordinary correlation analysis, could be discovered by using wavelet 
techniques (Rua and Nunes, 2009; Ranta, 2013). Moreover, the wavelet coherence used 
in our study fits the analysis of co-movement between economic variables. While 
debate and disagreement continue on the subject, with the introduction of multi-
resolution analysis, a novel approach to this issue can be achieved.  
In this section, the continuous wavelet transform (CWT) is applied to investigate the 
cross-correlation between the levered and unlevered betas in relation to capital structure 
and debt. This enables us to analyse the lead-lag relationship between the variables 
studied. CWT allows for analysing time series from the two perspectives of frequency 
and time domain simultaneously, which also helps to capture localized intermittent 
periodicities. Since this is a very well-known technique in quantitative finance, we have 
applied it without providing further theoretical foundation or methodological 
explanation.  
We follow Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) definition of excess cross-correlations in our 
study of the European markets in order to make a comparison between correlations at 
different time scales by extracting time-frequency features.  We focus on the lead-lag 
relationship between βs and the other variables: ‘capital structure’ and ‘debt to total 
asset’. We use the wavelet transform coherence (WTC) between the pairs as presented 
in figures 5 and 6. 
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We have computed the systematic risk for the seven countries on a weekly basis to 
provide relatively high frequency data (326 weeks) for the WTC model. While the 
systematic risk changes from one week to another, the debt to total assets remains the 
same for each quarter. In addition, to illustrate the value added of this analysis, we have 
adopted high frequency data by using weekly data starting from week 1 (w1= 
02/01/2007) to week 326 (w326= 26/03/2013). The WTC model finds regions in time 
frequency spaces where the two-time series co-vary, but do not necessarily have high 
power. The model of the WTC selection process for the two portfolios, namely LD and 
HD using β from weekly returns yielded results ranging from week 1 (w1= 02/01/2007) 
to week 320 (w320= 26/03/2013). 
Figures 5 and 6 (5 graphs from 5.a to 5.e and 3 graphs from 6.a to 6.c) present the 
wavelet coherence between the levered and unlevered β and the studied variables. The 
shortest time scale in the figures is one week. In the graphs, the 5% significance level 
against red noise is shown as a thick contour (displayed as a black parabolic line). The 
relative phase relationship is shown as pointing arrows (- Right: in-phase; - Left: anti-
phase). The co-movement is expressed through high coherency (red areas), which show 
strong local correlation and low coherency (blue areas) indicating low correlation. The 
cross-wavelet coherency is therefore able to determine the varying characteristics of the 
relationship between the levered and unlevered βs and the other parameters in the time–
frequency domain. This enables us to analyse the short-term and long-term shocks of 
contagion. 
We can draw some significant conclusions from Figure 5; as can be seen, the wavelet 
coherence figures provide a prominent descriptive analysis of contagion. Based on an 
increase of a short time-scale cross-correlation (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Figures 6 
depicts a slight indication of contagion at several periods of time and the short time 
scales vary between different financial shocks in the European markets. Our data also 
shows many small areas of high-coherency starting from the first quarter of 2009, 
namely Q4. (quarter number 4) until the third quarter of 2011 (quarter number 14). The 
first result depicts a high correlation between levered and unlevered β that begins one 
quarter after the start of the global financial crisis. This large area highlights the 
negative effects of both GFC-2008 and the Euro-zone crisis of 2010. The year 2010 
could be linked to the second stage of the GFC-2008, which was followed by major 
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global instability. Specifically, a shock channel with simultaneous increase can be 
observed through co-movement, mainly at higher frequency-bands (below 4 quarters, 
namely one year) between levered and unlevered betas.  
We can see that for unlevered beta, the LD portfolio generally exhibits completely 
different behaviour compared with beta for both HD. Overall, we see a change in the 
trend in the cross-correlation between levered and unlevered beta (Figure 5.a) showing 
evidence of short term shock transmission with a structural break starting from the 
second quarter of 2010 (just after the quarter number 9). This may be due to the Euro-
zone crisis. The contagion effect due to leverage seems to be related to both short-run 
market linkages and fundamental-based linkages in which case the level of debt could 
be one of the major factors contributing to this turmoil in the capital market.  
Insert Figure 5.a here 
Insert Figure 5.b here 
Insert Figure 5.c here 
Insert Figure 5.d here 
Insert Figure 5.e here 
It appears from Figure 5.a that the ‘debt to equity’ for LD versus HD present different 
phase angles depending on time and for the scale less than 12 weeks (1 quarter). This 
means that this variable for the two portfolios (LD versus HD) is subject to shocks in 
the short run with a specific change in correlations for different points of time. 
However, this behaviour stays the same from week 80 up to week 250, quarter number 
6 to 20 (starting from 2010Q1). 
Insert Figure 6.a here 
Insert Figure 6.b here 
Insert Figure 6.c here 
The trends in Figure 5 show different red areas encompassing the two big shocks: GFC-
2008 and 2010 period of the Euro-zone crisis. The high correlation areas are bigger 
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with larger scales for the pair of levered beta HD and ‘debt to total assets’ HD than for 
the pair of levered beta LD and ‘capital structure’ LD (see: Figures: 5.d and 5.e). 
Consistently, the size and shape of the red area is larger in the case of the HD portfolio 
compared to the LD portfolio for both pairs. This suggests that in the case of levered 
beta for the LD portfolio, the shock transmission based on the leverage effect is less 
important compared to HD portfolio when considering ‘debt to total assets’. This shows 
that HD portfolios are more sensitive to shock transmission through the leverage effect.  
Figures 5.c and 5.d show clearly that, in the case of the HD portfolio, the behaviour of 
unlevered beta for both ‘capital structure’ and ‘debt to total assets’ is different. The red 
area, in terms of shape and size, is bigger for ‘debt to total assets’, thus indicating a 
higher sensitivity to unlevered beta. Consequently, the contagion through unlevered 
beta is higher with ‘debt to total assets’ as a more conducive channel. The increase in 
correlation occurs mainly within a very short period (at the beginning of the quarter 1) 
to the fourth quarter, however it increases when there is a longer time period (around 
quarter 4 to quarter 13 -2008Q2). Moreover, the breakpoint between a changing short 
time-scale correlation and an approximately constant long time-scale correlation varies 
around quarter 7 (Week 144 - 06/10/2009; 2009-Q4) and quarter 13 (Week 235 - 
05/07/2011; 2011-Q2). Therefore, it can be said that the wavelet coherence method is 
vital in terms of detecting the span effect of the European sovereign debt crisis as a 
huge channel of contagion transmission, which cannot be seen through a classical 
method analysis. We also find that during high cross-correlations, levered beta (idem 
for unlevered beta) is in-phase and positively correlated with ‘debt to total assets’ for 
LD, while the opposite occurs for HD. The first outcome is in line with the theory that 
a firm with low debt will see its systematic risk increase with an increase in debt, while 
the second outcome, quite surprisingly, indicates that a firm with debt of more than 
33% will see its systematic risk decrease with the decrease of debt. 
More generally, figure 5 panels and figure 6 panels show a shock transmission channel 
with a simultaneous increase that can be observed through co-movement mainly at 
relatively higher frequency-bands (below 12 months) between levered beta (idem for 
unlevered beta) and both ‘capital structure’ and ‘debt to total assets’. The levered β of 
HD is leading the debt to total asset only during a short period (the period of the crisis 
until the second quarter of 2009 for the scale around 4 weeks), while there is no 
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significant lead/lag relationship between levered beta (respectively unlevered beta) of 
LD and the debt to total asset. 
We have therefore examined contagion among the seven major European markets and 
found some changes in the correlations of shorter time scales which increase 
significantly for longer time scales. These correlations remain approximately the same 
with a breakpoint at a specific point of the time scale. We can, therefore, conclude that 
contagion has been a major factor within the seven European markets and that this 
occurred several times during the period of the two shocks: GFC-2008 and the Euro-
zone sovereign debt crisis.  
5.6. Summary of analysis 
The three econometric techniques employed in the analysis of the results are the 
dynamic GMM; portfolio theory to compute systematic risk for levered and unlevered 
betas; and the wavelet coherence based on the pairs test. The first and the third 
techniques are appropriate for nonparametric data. The assumptions for parametric data 
are not relaxed for the second case. Each technique is employed to determine whether 
a change in the level of debt changes the systematic risk. The first GMM technique 
indicates that a higher level debt (above 33% threshold) is associated with a higher 
degree of systematic risk output. It should be noted that our results are in line with the 
findings of Lev (1974), Hamada (1972), Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975), Castagna and 
Matolcsy (1978) and more recently with the findings of Chen et al. (2012). 
Our findings also show that systematic risk correlates positively both with the size of 
the firm and lagged value of ROE, while ‘price to book value’ correlates negatively 
with systematic risk. In the case of the second technique (portfolio theory), we found 
some evidence that higher debt is associated with a higher degree of levered and 
unlevered betas. Furthermore, this analysis has enabled us to rank markets according to 
their stability and systematic risk with regard to HD and LD strategies. The third 
technique (Wavelet coherence) provides evidence for short-term shock transmission 
with a structural break during GFC-2008 as well as the following two years. These 
show a higher severity of the contagion effect one quarter after GFC-2008 and during 
the Euro zone crisis, due to high leverage. This seems to be related to both short-run 
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market linkages as well as having a high level of debt as one of the fundamental-based 
linkages. 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
Our study has assessed firm’s risk exposure within the capital structure theory by 
analysing the impact of firm’s debt on systematic risk in the case of: low debt (LD) and 
high debt (HD) firms. The findings suggest that (i) the systematic risk (β) of the firm 
changes with changes in the capital structure and the estimates depend on the two levels 
of debt (less than 33% and more than 33%); (ii) the Islamic-compliant stocks (seen from 
the debt level ratio) are shown in most cases to carry less risk than conventional stock, 
while they do not necessarily out-perform in terms of return; (iii) during the global 
financial crisis, Shari’ah compliant stocks show lower values of systematic risk (β) in 
the case of LD portfolios compared with HD portfolios. This feature is particularly 
present among portfolios (LD versus HD) within the same country and for almost all 
countries in the study. Our findings broadly suggest that the leverage effect is 
significantly and positively associated with systematic risk and that leverage augments 
systematic risk. This has implications for micro-stability with regard to Shari’ah stock 
screening.  
We adopted a panel GMM framework which allowed us to control simultaneously for 
country and firm characteristic effects, while taking into account heterogeneity across 
firms. The outcome suggests that systematic risk for LD firms is usually less than the 
systematic risk for HD firms, which is in line with the financial theory. Our findings 
show a significantly positive correlation between debt and sensitivity to market risk. 
Importantly, the GMM analysis of the whole panel, combining firms with a low and 
high level of debt, suggests that the systematic risk behaves differently depending on 
the level of debt (debt over total assets) as recommended by Shari’ah stock screening 
guidelines. The value drops by 24% (from 0.49966 to 0.37932) for firms with a ratio of 
‘debt to equity’ of less than 33% compared with firms with a ratio more than 33%. The 
firm’s size, the lagged ROE and the lagged value of beta are positively correlated with 
the systematic risk, while the latter is negatively correlated with the ‘price to the book 
value’, which is consistent with the theory. However, sovereign debt and exchange rates 
appear to have no significant impact on the systematic risk.  
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Systematic risk analysis across countries has mostly shown that, in general, LD 
portfolios have less systematic risk than both HD and the portfolios for the same 
countries. Moreover, France has shown higher risk related to the HD portfolio in 
comparison with the other six countries, while Germany has shown higher risk related 
to the LD portfolio. Conversely, Austria has shown the lowest systematic risk in the 
case of low debt firms. This allows for ranking of the seven markets according to their 
level of stability in terms of systematic risk (levered and unlevered betas).  
The third technique based on wavelet coherence (which focuses on different stock-
holding periods or investment horizons of the investors) has shown that the level of 
debt plays a substantial role in the shorter-term shock transmission for levered and 
unlevered betas (compared to the longer-term shock), especially during periods of 
turmoil. 
Overall, our findings, within the identified sample, are broadly consistent with the 
capital structure theory in which a firm’s level of debt in Shari’ah stock screening can 
control for the systematic risk of a portfolio. This can play a significant role in investors’ 
decision-making and outwardly in terms of the micro-stability of the stock market in 
terms of lowering systematic risk. 
The approach followed in this study is based on the ratio of the first criteria of Shari’ah 
stock screening and can be extended to the other Shari’ah screening ratios for capital 
market listed firms in all the studied countries. The GMM analysis in this study could 
be extended to more heterogeneous countries rather than focusing solely on the seven 
European countries. It would also be of interest to examine other parameters such as 
the total volatility and the Sharpe ratio in relation to Shari’ah stock screening criteria 
within the same approach and by adding other macro-economic variables at the country 
level. 
In terms of policy implications, evidence of how systematic risk is affected by the firm’s 
leverage is relevant to managers, investors and regulators alike. From our findings, at 
the regulatory level, regulators may consider issuing standards on reducing the level of 
(excessive) debt in the stock market to be followed by all listed companies regarding 
the detrimental impact of excessive debt on business viability. Even though this 
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measure could be useful, it would be insufficient on its own because of other negative 
factors, namely the influence of bad news, herd behaviour, etc.  
The second policy implication would be at the investor’s level: higher leverage tends 
to increase systematic risk and decrease market micro-stability. This makes equity 
investment in the firm riskier without providing a higher return. Therefore, investors 
may choose not to participate in any new recapitalization of a listed firm if the latter 
would not be able to reduce its leverage. This may open up a new way to partnership 
that is based on musharakah (balanced partnership between the investors and the 
entrepreneurs) within the Shari’ah compliant firms in the stock market. In addition, 
investors may re-consider their current positions by investing more in Shari’ah 
compliant companies since these firms are not heavily involved in high leverage and 
therefore provide more stability with a reasonable return. Future research related to the 
sukuk index as a benchmark may also be considered.   
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Tables  
Table 1 
Breakdown of low and high debt firms in relation to their countries 
Code Country Name Initial 
Sample 
Filtered 
Sample 
Low Debt 
Sample 
High 
Debt 
Sample 
1 AU Austria 132 116 28 35 
2 FR France 856 74 32 38 
3 GM Germany 1172 455 181 161 
4 IT Italy 364 99 12 33 
5 NL Netherland 219 98 51 47 
6 PL Poland 637 68 0 24 
7 SP Spain 216 75 0 47 
Total   3596 985 304 385 
 
Table 2 
Classification and definitions of variables 
Name of the Variables Included in the Model 
(1) 
Abbreviation Exogeneity Status 
Systematic risk 𝛽"# Strictly Endogenous  
 Lagged Total debt divided by total equity 𝐷"#)* Predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
 Market capitalisation of the firm MarketCap"# Strictly Exogenous 
Lagged Systematic Risk   L1.Beta Strictly Exogenous 
Price to Book Value or Market-to-Book price2bv or 
MTBit 
Strictly Exogenous 
Foreign Exchange EUR/US$ forex_q Strictly Exogenous 
Country sovereign Debt to GDP Ratio d2gdp_q or 	D2GDPM# Strictly Exogenous 
 Weight of the firm based on the size of the 
sample using total assets 
W or 	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸"# Predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
Lagged Capital Structure L1.Capstruct Predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
Lagged Return on Equity L1.ROE  or 	𝑅𝑂𝐸"#)* Predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
Lagged Sales to Total Assets L1.s2ta Predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
Dummy Variable equal to 1 if theD2TASSETS ≤ 33%; 
otherwise zero. 
dmy_d2ta Predetermined but not strictly exogenous. 
Interactive Dummy Variable = 𝐶𝑎𝑝_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑡		𝑥	𝑑𝑚𝑦_𝑑2𝑡𝑎 inter_dmy_d2ta Predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
Dummy Variable for the first structural break DUM_HD Predetermined but not strictly exogenous. 
Dummy Variable for the 2nd structural break DUM_LD Predetermined but not strictly exogenous. 
 
 
 
 
  
el Alaoui, AbdelKader Ouatik; Bacha, O. I; Masih, M. & Asutay, Mehmet (2016). “Shari'ah Stock Screening, 
Sensitivity to Market Risk and Contagion: A Multi-Country Analysis”, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.023. 
Please refer to the published version at the JEBO (2016) 
35 
	
Table 3.a 
Dynamic panel data estimators using GMM for beta risk versus capital structure: (*) 
Estimations are computed with 95% Confidence Interval (p < 0.05) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Beta Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Lagged Systematic Risk .2490 3.93 .1449 1.85 .2008 2.50* .1225 1.60 
Lagged Capital Structure .0002 1.03 .0023 2.16 .0027 2.54* .0015 2.21 
Interactive Dummy -.0090 -0.49 -.0061 -0.62 -.0119 -0.90 -.0134 -1.01 
Dummy Variable -.1284 -4.34 -.1337 -3.77 -.1203 -3.68 -.1563 -4.45 
Foreign Exchange EUR/US$ .0119 0.66 .0159 0.50 -.0018 -0.07 -.0109 -0.26 
Lagged Return on Equity .00002 1.15 .0002 2.20 .0003 2.60* .0002 2.26 
Weight 418.32 3.28 442.22 2.79 384.83 2.99* 439.97 2.53 
Debt to GDP Ratio -.0015 -1.75 -.0017 -1.68 -.0014 -1.53 -.0012 -0.99 
Lagged Sales to Total Assets -.0040 -1.10 -.0969 -1.54 -.1158 -1.85 -.0995 -1.41 
Price to Book Value -.0003 -7.45 -.0006 -4.27 -.0007 -3.62* -.0003 -1.44 
Market Capitalisation -3e-06 -1.47 -3e-06 -1.57 -2.3e-06 -1.30 -3.4e-06 1.50 
_cons (Constant) .3529 7.79 .4900 5.77 .4997 5.99* .5330 5.31 
          AR(1) – { z or P> z } -6.40 .000 -5.67 .000 -5.80 .000 -5.67 .000 
AR(2) – { z or P> z } 2.21 .027 0.85 .395 0.92 .360 0.65 .517 
Sargan test of overid Chi2 732.4 .00 405.2 .00 561.6 .00 418.89 .00 
Hansen test of overid Chi2 270.4 .001 209.6 .003 268.6 .045 193.69 .004 
         GMM Hansen Ex. G.   Chi2 [1] 183.6 .00 123.5 .000 182.5 .037 127.42 .00 
GMM Diff. (H0= exo.) Chi2 [2] 86.8 .00 86.07 .329 86.1 .329 66.27 .754 
iv Hansen Ex. G. Chi2 [3] 671.94 .00 203.0 .003 258.8 .066 183.98 .006 
iv Difference (H0: Exo.)  Chi2 [4] 810.63 .901 6.57 .255 9.73 .083 9.71 .084 
Nb. Instruments| Nb. Obs 216 5528 168 5528 243 5528 156 5528 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.b 
GMM for Beta–Sensitivity to market risk versus capital structure including structural breaks: 
All the estimations are computed with 95% Confidence Interval (p < 0.05) 
Variables Beta 
Lagged 
Systemat
ic Risk 
Dummy 
Variable  Weight 
Price to 
Book 
Value  
Dummy for 
LD _cons  
2-step 
Robust NC 
(4 4) 
Coef. .2084 -.1787 294.76 -.0003 -.0468 .3856 
t 2.31 -1.93 3.98  -3.40 -3.01 4.89 
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Table 4 
Levered 𝛽 per country for high debt and low debt (min. max and delta max-min) 
Countries 
Levered Beta per country, HD 
  
Levered Beta per country, LD 
  
Min HD Max HD Delta Min HD Max HD Delta 
Austria 0.020 0.05 0.030 0 0.01 0.010 
France 0.032 0.082 0.050 -0.003 0.032 0.035 
Germany 0.028 0.065 0.037 0.014 0.048 0.034 
Italy  0.015 0.060 0.045 0.000 0.025 0.025 
Netherland 0.008 0.068 0.060 0.001 0.062 0.061 
Spain 0.030 0.046 0.016       
Poland 0.005 0.038 0.033       
	
Figures  
   
 
Fig. 1. Zivot-Andrews Test for Structural Break – Lagged Capital Structure (HD+LD), HD and 
LD firms 
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Fig. 2.a. Levered β LD, HD and Combined LD+HD (689 firms) 
 
Figure 2.a: Levered BETA (β) LD. HD and Combined LD+HD (689 Firms) 
 
 
 
 
	
Fig. 2.b. Unlevered β LD, HD and combined LD+HD - All firms 
 
 
Q2	
Q16	
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Fig. 2.c. Weighted Capital Structure and Debt to Total Assets for HD, LD and 
combined - all firms   
	
	
Fig. 3.a. 𝛽 Austria for LD, HD - Combined  
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Fig. 3.b. 𝛽 France for LD, HD – Combined 
 
Fig. 3.c. 𝛽 Germany for LD, HD – Combined 
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Fig. 3.d. 𝛽 Italy for LD, HD - Combined 
 
 
	 Fig. 3.e. 𝛽 Netherland for LD, HD - Combined  
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     Fig. 4. Levered 𝛽 per country for HD and LD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.a. WTC: Debt to Total Assets LD vs Debt to Total Assets HD, The black parabolic line 
(a thick contour) shows the 5% significance level; Red areas indicate strong correlation, Blue 
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areas indicate low correlation, Co-movement is expressed through high coherency with red 
colour, Phase relationship is shown as pointing arrows: Right: in-phase, Left: anti-phase. 
 
Fig. 5.b. WTC - Levered β LD vs Levered HD 
 
Fig. 5.c. WTC - Unlevered β LD vs unlevered β HD 
 
Fig. 5.d. WTC - Levered β LD vs Debt to Total Assets LD 
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Fig. 5.e. WTC - Levered β HD vs Debt to Total Assets HD 
 
Fig. 6.a. WTC - Levered β HD vs Capital Structure HD, Red areas indicate strong correlation, 
Blue areas indicate low correlation, Co-movement is expressed through high coherency with 
red colour, Phase relationship is shown as pointing arrows: Right: in-phase, Left: anti-phase. 
 
Fig. 6.b. WTC - Unlevered β LD vs Capital Structure LD 
 
 
Fig. 6.c. WTC - Unlevered β LD vs Debt to Total Assests LD 
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Appendix 
List and Status of All Sectors based on Qualitative Stock Shari’ah Screening 
 
List of sectors (Excluded and Included) Status 
Banks, Beverages, Equity Investment Instruments, Equity Warrants, Financial Services, Fixed 
Line Telecommunications, Food and Drug Retailers, Food Producers, Leisure Goods, Life 
Insurance, Media, Non-Equity Investment Instruments, Nonlife Insurance, Other Equities, Other 
Warrants, Real Estate Investment and Services, Real Estate Investment Trusts, Suspended 
Equities, Tobacco, Travel and Leisure, Unclassified, Unquoted equities. 
Excluded 
Aerospace and Defence, Alternative Energy, Automobiles and Parts, Chemicals, Construction and 
Materials, Electricity, Electronic and Electrical Equipment, Fixed Line Telecommunications, 
Forestry and Paper, Gas, Water and Multi-utilities, General Industrials, General Retailers, Health 
Care Equipment and Services, Household Goods and Home Construction, Industrial Engineering, 
Industrial Metals and Mining, Industrial Transportation, Mining, Mobile Telecommunications, 
Oil and Gas Producers, Oil Equipment and Services, Personal Goods, Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology, Software and Computer Services, Support Services, Technology Hardware and 
Equipment. 
Included 
  
 
 
	
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
